Did NAFTA spur Texas exports? by Anil Kumar
T he North American Free Trade Agree-
ment unites the United States, Mexico and
Canada—three nations with a combined
population of 426 million, total output of
more than $13 trillion and regional trade of
$700 billion in goods and services. 
Because of the North American mar-
ket’s sheer size, NAFTA has been repeated-
ly dissected. Most studies have sought to
determine whether the pact fulfilled propo-
nents’ predictions of increased trade, lower
prices and higher incomes or led to what
critics warned would be a “giant sucking
sound” of U.S. jobs going to Mexico. 
On balance, researchers have found
NAFTA a slight positive for the U.S. as a
whole. For example, a 1996 study estimat-
ed that NAFTA had increased U.S. exports
by $5 billion, or 12 percent, a figure pro-
jected to grow as more of NAFTA’s phased-
in trade liberalization took effect.1
A lesser volume of research focuses
on what NAFTA has meant to state and
local economies, although theory and com-
mon sense suggest trade deals might have
different impacts within countries. States’
industrial mixes and workforces vary wide-
ly, leading to comparative advantages that
influence the composition and destination
of exports. Geography is another key fac-
tor. Firms may operate in one state rather
than another to take advantage of proximity
to newly opened markets. The results of
national studies of NAFTA’s effects may not
apply uniformly to all states.
Texas is one of the more interesting
lenses through which to assess NAFTA. The
state lies near the center of NAFTA’s eco-
nomic space—about equidistant from
Mexico City and Toronto, with a 1,200-mile
frontier with Mexico and networks of high-
ways and rail lines that lead to some of the
world’s busiest border crossings. Texas
political and business leaders strongly sup-
ported NAFTA’s ratification, an indication
that many presumed it would benefit the
state’s economy.
Has NAFTA been good for Texas?
Merely counting the truckloads passing
through border checkpoints in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley, Laredo and El Paso
would make it seem so. A more definitive
answer, though, involves distilling NAFTA’s
influence from factors responsible for over-
all increases in Texas exports over the past
decade or so. 
NAFTA can’t be deemed a success for
Texas if rising exports to Mexico merely
represent sales diverted from markets else-
where in the world. Trade theory suggests
that overall economic effects of NAFTA and
other preferential trade agreements depend
on trade creation net of trade diversion
(see box). 
A fresh look at the issue, using indus-
try-level export data, shows that NAFTA
did indeed increase Texas’ sales to
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Trade Creation Versus Trade Diversion
Preferential trade agreements impose lower tariffs on trade in goods and services among their
member countries. Even with expansion of the multinational World Trade Organization in recent years,
nations have found these regional deals increasingly attractive, concluding more than 180 pacts since
1990.
Two types of preferential deals are common. Free trade areas, such as NAFTA, reduce tariffs on
goods from member countries but allow each nation to set its own duties for nonmembers. Customs
unions, such as the European Union, agree to impose a common tariff wall on imports from nonmem-
ber countries. In economic terms, they’re similar, so the following discussion applies to both.
These preferential agreements would normally violate the WTO’s most favored nation rules, which
require each member to extend to other members the lowest tariff applicable on all goods and services.
In other words, there should be no discrimination or preference in tariffs. To allow the existence of free
trade agreements and customs unions, WTO rules exempt them from the most favored nation rule if they
mandate complete tariff elimination among member countries and if tariffs to nonmembers are no higher
than they were before.
Both theory and experience suggest that free trade increases economic welfare. Does the proposi-
tion hold for preferential deals as well?  
Jacob Viner provided the answer in his classic 1950 book, The Customs Union Issue. It introduced
two important concepts—trade creation, which denotes new imports and exports, and trade diversion,
which means a mere shifting of sources from one country to another. Viner argued that only trade deals
that lead to net trade creation would improve economic welfare. If net trade diversion occurs primarily
by shifting production from a low-cost nonmember country to a high-cost member country, it will hurt
overall economic welfare.
Texas is one of the more 
interesting lenses through 
which to assess NAFTA.Mexico—and to Canada as well. Perhaps
more interesting, NAFTA also helped raise
Texas exports to Asia, Europe and Latin
America, making a strong case for net
trade creation.
Before and After NAFTA
NAFTA went into effect Jan. 1, 1994.
In general, it mandated eliminating trade
barriers by 2008. For many products, the
agreement did away with tariffs and other
restraints immediately. Agriculture and
apparel were the main sectors scheduled
to be liberalized over a longer period. 
Pre-NAFTA Mexico had the more pro-
tected economy, so it committed to larger
tariff cuts than the U.S. and Canada.
Average Mexican duties on U.S. goods fell
from 12 percent in 1993 to 1.3 percent in
2001, while U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods
declined from 2.1 percent to 0.2 percent.2
The effect of NAFTA on U.S.–Canada trade
restraints was minimal because the two
countries operated under a free-trade
agreement that took effect in 1989.
Trade has increased by leaps and
bounds in the NAFTA years. U.S. exports
to Mexico rose from $42 billion in 1993 to
$111 billion in 2004, while imports from
Mexico increased from $40 billion to $156
billion. Over the same period, U.S. sales to
Canada grew from $100 billion to $189 bil-
lion, while imports from Canada to the U.S.
climbed from $111 billion to $256 billion. 
During the first six years of NAFTA,
Texas gained ground in many foreign mar-
kets, allowing the state to grow faster than
the nation in overall exports (Chart 1A).
Texas exports to Mexico also increased—
but not by any more than the nation as a
whole. From 1994 to 2000, the growth of
Texas shipments across the Rio Grande
mirrored that of U.S. exports, just as it did
in the five years prior to NAFTA’s taking
effect (Chart 1B).3 Indeed, both Texas and
U.S. exports to Mexico grew steadily before
and after NAFTA, except for a sharp
decline in 1995, the year following the
pact’s implementation. An economic crisis
in Mexico led to a steep devaluation of the
peso vis-à-vis the dollar, making U.S.
exports to Mexico more expensive. 
Given Texas’ proximity to Mexico, it
might be surprising that the state didn’t
increase its market share under NAFTA.
Interestingly, one of the expanding markets
has been Canada, the NAFTA partner far-
ther from Texas (Chart 1C). 
Although trade grew faster with
Canada, there’s no denying the importance
of Mexico to the state’s economy. In 1993,
nearly 40 percent of Texas’ exports went
to Mexico, compared with less than 10
percent of overall U.S. exports (Chart 2).
The state trailed the U.S. average in sales
to Canada and all other regions except
Latin America.
In the NAFTA years, Mexico has
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Chart 1
U.S. and Texas Exports:
Pre- and Post-NAFTA
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Trade has increased 
by leaps and bounds 
in the NAFTA years.
A.
B.
C.become even more dominant as a market
for Texas. By 2000, Mexico received more
than 45 percent of Texas’ exports, and
Canada also gained as a destination for
Texas products.
Broad-based data on exports suggest
continuity rather than change in the first
years NAFTA was in effect. Texas and the
U.S. sold more to Mexico and Canada in
2000 than they did in 1993, but general
trade patterns didn’t change all that much
in the six-year period. NAFTA’s impacts on
the Texas economy emerge more clearly by
looking at the changes in exports by industry.
Looking at Industry Data 
For both the U.S. and Texas, the lead-
ing exports are largely the same—industrial
machinery including computer equipment,
transportation equipment, electronics,
chemicals and instruments (Chart 3). They
reflect America’s comparative advantages in
the global marketplace. Texas’ mix differs
from the rest of the country—electronics,
for example, has emerged as a particular
strength for the state. Even so, the same
five categories were at the top before
NAFTA in 1993 and after it in 2000.
In terms of overall exports, some
major Texas industries show distinct breaks
from their pre-NAFTA trends (Chart 4).
Texas electronics companies, for example,
saw their exports grow significantly faster
after NAFTA went into effect. Chemicals,
which were dropping prior to the trade
deal, began to rise after its implementation.
After an initial decline due to Mexico’s
peso crisis of 1994, transportation equip-
ment experienced an uptick in its growth
rate. 
Not all sectors show rising exports.
Texas sales of lumber and wood had been
increasing before 1994 but declined after
NAFTA. Furniture and fixtures show a simi-
lar pattern.
Industry data suggest churning
beneath the surface for Texas exports.
How much of it can be attributed to
NAFTA? The answer requires a model that
takes into account other factors that might
contribute to the state’s expanding over-
seas sales. Income growth in Texas and
Mexico would affect exports because richer
countries tend to buy more overseas. The
real exchange rate between the U.S. and
Mexico is especially important because the
period under study includes Mexico’s peso
crisis, which induced wide swings in trade. 
The worldwide march toward freer
trade deserves consideration because it,
too, could be expected to increase Texas
exports. Since 1990, nations have signed
more than 180 regional free-trade agree-
ments. Among the more important ones
were the European Union’s steps toward
integration in 1992 and the liberalization in
Latin America symbolized by the Southern
Common Market, or Mercosur. 
Controlling for incomes, a time trend,
exchange rates, the EU opening, Mercosur
and other industry- or country-specific fac-
tors allows us to isolate NAFTA’s impact on
28 Texas industries. When it comes to
exports to Mexico, 19 of these industries
benefited from NAFTA, while nine saw sales
decline. Texas exports to Canada rose for 18
industries and fell for 10. Half of the 28
industries gained in both countries, while
six declined in both countries (Chart 5).
Industries with statistically significant
gains in exports to Mexico as a result of
NAFTA were rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products (79 percent), printing and
publishing (78 percent), textile mill prod-
ucts (75 percent), petroleum and coal prod-
ucts (69 percent), leather and leather prod-
ucts (71 percent) and electronic equipment
(49 percent). Significant declines were
found in lumber and wood products (89
percent) and furniture and fixtures (75 per-
cent). 
The statistically significant NAFTA win-
ners in terms of exports to Canada were oil
and gas exploration equipment (286 per-
cent), furniture and fixtures (75 percent),
industrial machinery including computers
(70 percent), apparel (66 percent), instru-
ments and related products (58 percent)
and rubber and miscellaneous plastic prod-
ucts (54 percent). The only significant
decline was in metal mining (88 percent). 
The diversity in gains and losses of
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • MARCH/APRIL 2006 SouthwestEconomy 5
Chart 3
Composition of Exports: 1993–2000
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chemicals and instruments.exports among industries suggests trade
deals affect economic sectors differently.
Lower tariffs no doubt gave some Texas
industries an advantage over Mexican and
Canadian companies. Export declines might
signal an inability to compete, although
they could simply reflect some firms’ deci-
sions to shift economic activity to other
states. Because Texas had more winners
than losers, though, we can conclude that
NAFTA in general made Texas industries
more competitive. 
Overall, NAFTA had an export-weight-
ed average effect of 28 percent on Texas
exports to Mexico. Adjusted for inflation,
the trade deal accounted for roughly a
quarter of Texas’ 111 percent increase in
exports to Mexico between 1993 and 2000. 
During the same period, Texas’
NAFTA-related exports to Canada rose 47
percent, or about a third of the state’s 131
percent gain in that market. Texas sells
quite a bit more to Mexico than to Canada.
Even if the percentage effect is smaller, the
NAFTA-led increases in exports to Mexico
are larger in dollar terms.
The results indicate that NAFTA stimu-
lated Texas’ exports. These findings are sim-
ilar to those of a St. Louis Fed study.4 Using
a different state-level database covering the
years 1988 to 1997, they estimated that
NAFTA increased Texas exports to Mexico
by 14 percent and to Canada by 28 percent.
Global Gains
Did gains in the Mexican and
Canadian markets come at the expense of
exports to the rest of the world? 
The answer is no. In addition to
boosting North American sales, NAFTA also
contributed to moderate gains in Texas’
exports to other parts of the world. The
trade deal helped boost sales by 17 per-
cent in Latin America, not including
Mexico; 15 percent in Europe; and 13 per-
cent in Asia. 
NAFTA didn’t open non-North
American markets, so why would it help
Texas exports to the rest of the world? The
answer likely lies in the reorganization of
production that comes with exposure to
the global marketplace. As North American
trade barriers fell, Texas exporters had new
incentives to become more competitive,
perhaps by cutting costs to match rivals’
prices or by incorporating lower-priced
inputs from Mexico. Other factors might
also be at work. The international-trade
expertise that firms gained by selling to
Mexico may have helped them penetrate
Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Countries may
have informally reduced import barriers as
part of a strategy to achieve free-trade
agreements with the U.S.
The estimates of NAFTA’s impacts on
Texas exports don’t account for Mexico’s
highly successful maquiladora program,
which allows U.S. goods to enter Mexico
duty-free for further processing and re-
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SOURCE: WISERTradeexport to the United States. 
In the debate leading to NAFTA’s ratifi-
cation, experts differed on how the trade
pact would affect the maquiladoras. Some
thought it would strengthen them by boost-
ing investment in the plants. Others argued
that it would erode the maquilas’ advan-
tage by lowering tariffs on nearly all
imports to Mexico. 
Maquiladora employment has grown
steadily for decades, but it accelerated
under NAFTA (Chart 6). However, a 2001
Dallas Fed study concluded that NAFTA
had a negative but statistically insignificant
influence on the maquiladoras.5 If the
industry hadn’t weakened, the estimates of
NAFTA’s effects on Texas exports would
have been larger.
Texas now ranks as America’s top
exporting state, with about 14 percent of
the nation’s overseas sales. At least some
of the gains can be attributed to NAFTA,
which boosted 2000 exports by an esti-
mated 23 percent above their pre-NAFTA
1993 levels. The trade pact’s gains have
been broadly based. Exports to Mexico
rose—as many expected—but Texas prod-
ucts have also found expanding markets
in Canada, Europe, Asia and Latin America
as a direct result of NAFTA. The added
overseas sales amount to a moderate gain
for the state’s economy, leading to faster
growth and new jobs.
More Texas exports are only half the
story. NAFTA also operated at the industry
level, prompting a reorganization consistent
with the theory of comparative advantage.
As North American barriers fell, such
knowledge- and capital-intensive industries
as electronics, chemicals, transportation
equipment and industrial machinery
received a stimulating jolt. Labor-intensive
industries, like lumber and furniture,
couldn’t maintain their exports.
The data don’t allow industry-specific
assessment of NAFTA beyond 2000.
However, the steady increase in overall
Texas exports in recent years at least sug-
gests that NAFTA continues to exert a posi-
tive effect on the state’s economy. 
Kumar is an economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
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Chart 5
Industry Winners and Losers from NAFTA
NOTE: Oil and gas equipment, although statistically significant at a 286 percent increase, falls outside the boundaries of
this chart.
SOURCE: WISERTrade















































Texas Exports to Mexico and 
Maquiladora Employment: 
Pre- and Post-NAFTA
Index, 1988 = 100